BATTLE OF CANNAE
The Battle of Cannae, a major battle of the Second Punic War, took place on 2 August 216 BC in Apulia in southeast Italy. The army of Carthage under Hannibal fought and beat the much larger army of the Roman Republic under the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. It is one of the greatest battles in known history, with the strategies employed by Hannibal still being taught today in the Military.
The Roman forces totaled 80,000 infantry, 2,400 Roman cavalry and 4,000 allied horse (involved in the actual battle) and, in the two fortified camps, 2,600 heavily armed men, 7,400 lightly armed men (a total of 10,000), approximately 86,400 men.
The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions. There were 8,000 Libyans, 8,000 Iberians, 16,000 Gauls and about 5,500 Gaetulian infantry. Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Iberian, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Liby-Phoenician cavalry. Finally, Hannibal had around 8,000 skirmishers consisting of Balearic slingers and mixed nationality spearmen, a total of around 47,950.
Having recovered from their losses at Trebia in 218 BC and Lake Trasimene in 217 BC, the Romans decided to engage Hannibal at Cannae. With roughly 86,000 Roman and allied troops, the Romans massed their heavy infantry in a deeper formation than usual. Hannibal in the meantime utilized the double-envelopment tactic, this tactic proved devestating for the Roman forces, decimating them and ruining them as a fighting force. Following the defeat, Capua and several other Italian city-states defected from the Roman Republic to Carthage.
The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking "wings." The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry, hoping to use this to quickly break through the center of Hannibal's line. Bearing in mind that Hannibal's two previous victories had been largely decided by his trickery and ruse, Varro had sought an open battlefield. The field at Cannae was clear, with no possibility of hidden troops being brought to bear as an ambush
Hannibal deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses. He placed his Iberians and Gauls in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition across the front line, with himself right at the front and center. Infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. These infantry were battle-hardened, remained cohesive, and would attack the Roman flanks.
Hannibal placed the Iberian and Gaulish cavalry on the left (south near the Aufidus River) of the Carthaginian army. By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus river, Hannibal prevented this flank from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. The southern flank of his army had about 6,500 cavalry, and the northern flank of the army had 3,500 Numidians cavalry. This favoring of the Sountern side was crucial to Hannibal's plan.
When the 2 forces clashed, the cavalry engaged in a fierce battle on the flanks. Polybius described the Hispanic and Celtic horses in the south dismounting in what he considers a barbarian method of fighting. The Hispanic and Gauls quickly got the upper hand in the south and soon cut down the Roman cavalry without mercy. On the Northern flank the Numidians engaged in a way that was intended to keep the Roman cavalry occupied. Once the southern cavalry broke through the roman line they charged north towards the northern flank, forcing the remaining cavalry to flee with Hannibal's Cavalry in hot pursuit.
While the Carthaginians were in the process of defeating the cavalry, the mass of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in the center of the field. Hannibal stood with his men in the weak center and held them to a controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled inwards as they gradually withdrew slowly drawing Roman forces further in as they did. As they withdrew the african infantry on each flank continued to advance without opposition, beginning to surround the Roman forces on all but the rear side. In this retreat Hannibal had created a tight semicircle around the Roman troops, by doing so, he had turned the strength of the Roman infantry into a weakness. While the front ranks were gradually advancing, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose their cohesion,as they began crowding themselves into the growing gap. Soon they were compacted together so closely that they had little space to wield their weapons.
In pressing so far forward in their desire to destroy the retreating and seemingly collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the Romans had ignored the African troops who were still advancing on either side on the roman army.
The decisive moment came when Hannibal's Cavalry returned after successfully driving away the Roman Cavalry. They suprised the Romans attacking from their rear flank and closing the Circle of enemies that Hannibal had orchestrated. At this point Hannibal ordered all troops including the African infantry to close in on the now defensless Romans
When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in the rear and the African flanking echelons assailed them on their right and left, the advance of the Roman infantry was brought to an abrupt halt. The Romans were enclosed in a pocket with no means of escape. The Carthaginians created a wall and began destroying them. Polybius wrote, "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood."
In the aftermath of the battle it is estimated that over 70,000 Romans were slaughtered. On Hannibal's side only 8,000. Hannibal's victory was a bloody one which cost the Roman army and the Roman Republic dearly. In one descive battle Hannibal had crushed the Roman army using one of the earliest recorded instances of the 'pincer maneuver' soon many of Rome's previous allies defected to Hannibal further bolstering his forces and further weakening Rome's. Things were not looking good for Rome.
The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions. There were 8,000 Libyans, 8,000 Iberians, 16,000 Gauls and about 5,500 Gaetulian infantry. Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Iberian, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Liby-Phoenician cavalry. Finally, Hannibal had around 8,000 skirmishers consisting of Balearic slingers and mixed nationality spearmen, a total of around 47,950.
Having recovered from their losses at Trebia in 218 BC and Lake Trasimene in 217 BC, the Romans decided to engage Hannibal at Cannae. With roughly 86,000 Roman and allied troops, the Romans massed their heavy infantry in a deeper formation than usual. Hannibal in the meantime utilized the double-envelopment tactic, this tactic proved devestating for the Roman forces, decimating them and ruining them as a fighting force. Following the defeat, Capua and several other Italian city-states defected from the Roman Republic to Carthage.
The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking "wings." The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry, hoping to use this to quickly break through the center of Hannibal's line. Bearing in mind that Hannibal's two previous victories had been largely decided by his trickery and ruse, Varro had sought an open battlefield. The field at Cannae was clear, with no possibility of hidden troops being brought to bear as an ambush
Hannibal deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses. He placed his Iberians and Gauls in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition across the front line, with himself right at the front and center. Infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. These infantry were battle-hardened, remained cohesive, and would attack the Roman flanks.
Hannibal placed the Iberian and Gaulish cavalry on the left (south near the Aufidus River) of the Carthaginian army. By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus river, Hannibal prevented this flank from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. The southern flank of his army had about 6,500 cavalry, and the northern flank of the army had 3,500 Numidians cavalry. This favoring of the Sountern side was crucial to Hannibal's plan.
When the 2 forces clashed, the cavalry engaged in a fierce battle on the flanks. Polybius described the Hispanic and Celtic horses in the south dismounting in what he considers a barbarian method of fighting. The Hispanic and Gauls quickly got the upper hand in the south and soon cut down the Roman cavalry without mercy. On the Northern flank the Numidians engaged in a way that was intended to keep the Roman cavalry occupied. Once the southern cavalry broke through the roman line they charged north towards the northern flank, forcing the remaining cavalry to flee with Hannibal's Cavalry in hot pursuit.
While the Carthaginians were in the process of defeating the cavalry, the mass of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in the center of the field. Hannibal stood with his men in the weak center and held them to a controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled inwards as they gradually withdrew slowly drawing Roman forces further in as they did. As they withdrew the african infantry on each flank continued to advance without opposition, beginning to surround the Roman forces on all but the rear side. In this retreat Hannibal had created a tight semicircle around the Roman troops, by doing so, he had turned the strength of the Roman infantry into a weakness. While the front ranks were gradually advancing, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose their cohesion,as they began crowding themselves into the growing gap. Soon they were compacted together so closely that they had little space to wield their weapons.
In pressing so far forward in their desire to destroy the retreating and seemingly collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the Romans had ignored the African troops who were still advancing on either side on the roman army.
The decisive moment came when Hannibal's Cavalry returned after successfully driving away the Roman Cavalry. They suprised the Romans attacking from their rear flank and closing the Circle of enemies that Hannibal had orchestrated. At this point Hannibal ordered all troops including the African infantry to close in on the now defensless Romans
When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in the rear and the African flanking echelons assailed them on their right and left, the advance of the Roman infantry was brought to an abrupt halt. The Romans were enclosed in a pocket with no means of escape. The Carthaginians created a wall and began destroying them. Polybius wrote, "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood."
In the aftermath of the battle it is estimated that over 70,000 Romans were slaughtered. On Hannibal's side only 8,000. Hannibal's victory was a bloody one which cost the Roman army and the Roman Republic dearly. In one descive battle Hannibal had crushed the Roman army using one of the earliest recorded instances of the 'pincer maneuver' soon many of Rome's previous allies defected to Hannibal further bolstering his forces and further weakening Rome's. Things were not looking good for Rome.